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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Stephanie Henning pled guilty to two counts of grand theft.
She received an aggregate unified sentence of 24 years, with three years fixed. After the State
accused Ms. Henning of failing to pay the full amount of restitution for eight months, the district
court found Ms. Henning had willfully violated that term of her probation and revoked her
probation. On appeal, Ms. Henning contends that the district court erred in concluding that she
willfully violated her probation where she had demonstrated an inability to pay the full monthly
restitution amount. Alternatively, and assuming arguendo that Ms. Henning's violation was
willful, the district court abused its discretion by revoking Ms. Henning's probation not because
of her violation, but because it would not have chosen to put her on probation had it been the
district court that initially sentenced her. Ms. Henning also asserts that the district court abused
its discretion by revoking her probation where the court failed to consider alternatives to
revocation and where revocation did not serve the objectives of her probation.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
In 2015, Stephanie Henning pled guilty to two counts of grand theft after an investigation
revealed that she had taken approximately $155,000 from her employer over the course of five
years. (R., p.89.) (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI),1 pp.2-3.) The district
court sentenced Ms. Henning to a unified sentence of fourteen years, with two years fixed, on
one count, and ten years, with one year fixed, on the other count. (R., pp.70-73.) The district

1

Appellant's use of the designation "PSI" includes the packet of documents grouped with the
electronic copy of the PSI, and the page numbers cited shall refer to the corresponding page of
the electronic file.

1

court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively, but retained jurisdiction. (R., p.71.)
After a period of retained jurisdiction, the district court suspended the sentence and placed
Ms. Henning on probation for twenty-four years. (R., pp.748-757.)
In 2017, the State accused Ms. Henning of violating her probation by failing to pay each
month's restitution payment in full.

(R., pp.88-107.)

Pursuant to a plea agreement with a

reinstatement recommendation, Ms. Henning admitted to violating her probation, and the district
court reinstated her on probation on May 25, 2018, under the same terms and conditions.
(10/1/19 Tr., p.45, L.20 - p.46, L.11; R, pp.118-26.)
In 2019, the State again alleged that Ms. Henning violated her probation by failing to
make the requisite restitution payments in full from June 2018 to January 2019. (R., pp.127-73.)
Ms. Henning was approximately $1,200 behind on her payments during that six-month period.
(State's Exhibit 1.)
Ms. Henning denied the probation violation allegations. (R., p.180.) At the evidentiary
hearing, Ms. Henning's probation officer testified that Ms. Henning had come to him in
December of 2018, and said she was having trouble making the requisite monthly payment-she
was struggling.

(10/1/2019 Tr., p.11, Ls.2-28.)

After the hearing, the district court found

Ms. Henning had willfully failed to pay $650 per month from May 2018 to January 2019, as
required by the terms and conditions of her probation. (10/1/19 Tr., p.46, L.12 - p.47, L.24.) In
finding the allegations to be "willful," the district court stated, "I'm not satisfied that the
surpluses were spent in a way that was consistent with complying with the terms of her
probation." (10/1/19 Tr., p.62, Ls.1-6.)
At the disposition hearing, Ms. Henning' s counsel asked the court to continue her on
probation. (11/26/19 Tr., p.58, L.25 -p.59, L.1; p.62, Ls.6-8.) The State asked for imposition of

2

the suspended sentence. (11/26/19 Tr., p.58, Ls.18-20.) The State highlighted the underlying
crime, arguing to the court, "I am asking the Court to impose the sentence that was previously
given to Ms. Henning, but I'm not doing it because she isn't paying her restitution per se. I'm
asking that the Court do that because she embezzled almost $200,000 from [the victim] and that
crime deserves prison."

(11/26/19 Tr., p.55, Ls.19-24.)

The district court agreed, telling

Ms. Henning, "You were fortunate that Judge Neville was here the first time, because, frankly, I
would have sent you to prison the first time." (11/26/19 Tr., p.63, Ls.23-25.) The district court
told Ms. Henning at disposition, "[the prosecutor]'s right, this isn't about the probation violation.
This is a sentence for the original offense." (11/26/19 Tr. p.65, Ls.2-4.)
The district court revoked Ms. Henning's probation.

(11/26/19 Tr., p.65, Ls.5-9;

R., pp.194-97.) Ms. Henning filed a timely Notice of Appeal. 2 (R., pp.198-200.)

2

Ms. Henning filed an I.C.R. 35 motion for leniency, but did not submit new or additional
information in support of her motion. (R., pp.202-03.) The district court denied the motion.
(R., pp.211-14.) Ms. Henning does not challenge the district court's denial of her motion for
leniency on appeal. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that "[w ]hen presenting a Rule 35
motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional
information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion. State v.
Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007). "An appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion cannot be
used as a vehicle to review the underlying sentence absent the presentation of new information."
Id.
3

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court err in finding that Ms. Henning willfully violated her probation
where she was unable to pay the monthly restitution amount in full due to her indigency?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Ms. Henning's probation?

4

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred In Finding Ms. Henning Willfully Violated Her Probation

A.

Introduction
The district court erred by finding that Ms. Henning willfully violated her probation

where she was unable to pay the full amount of restitution each month due to her indigency. The
finding of willfulness is unsupported by substantial and competent evidence.

B.

Standard Of Review
The Idaho Supreme Court recently set forth the standards of review applicable to a trial

court's decision to revoke probation:
Review of a probation revocation proceeding involves a two-step analysis. First,
the Court determines whether the terms of probation have been violated. If they
have, it is determined whether the violation justifies revocation of the probation.
Id.
With regard to the first step, a district court may revoke probation only upon
evidence that the probationer has violated probation.... A court's fmding that a
violation has been proved will be upheld on appeal ifthere is substantial evidence
in the record to support the finding ....
As to the second step, the decision whether to revoke a defendant's probation for
a violation is within the discretion of the district court. Thus, we review a district
court's decision to revoke probation under an abuse of discretion standard.
In determining whether the district court abused its discretion, this Court
considers (1) whether the trial court understood the issue as discretionary; (2)
whether the trial court acted within its discretionary scope and under applicable
legal standards; and (3) whether the trial court exercised reason.

State v. Garner, 161 Idaho 708, 713 (2017) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).

5

C.

The District Court Erred In Finding Ms. Henning Willfully Violated Her Probation
Idaho Criminal Rule (I.C.R.) 33(f) provides: "The court shall not revoke probation unless

there is an admission by the defendant or a finding by the court, following a hearing, that the
defendant willfully violated a condition of probation." I.C.R. 33(f). 3 The Rule indicates that the
district court must find a "willful" violation in order to revoke the defendant's probation. See

Garner, 161 Idaho at 711 (holding "probation may only be revoked if the defendant's violation
was willful"); see also State v. Clausen, 163 Idaho 180, 184 (Ct. App. 2017) (holding "if full
review of the evidence by the district court does not support a fmding of willfulness then
revocation would be inappropriate"). In other words, I.C.R. 33(f) precludes the district court
from revoking the defendant's probation if the district court fmds that the defendant's violation
was non-willful. The district court's fmding of a willful probation violation must be supported
by substantial and competent evidence in the record. State v. Easley, 156 Idaho 214, 222 (2014);

State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009).
The Easley Court, in discussing the applicable legal standards for a district court's
decision to revoke probation, explained:
If a knowing and intentional probation violation has been proved, a district court's
decision to revoke probation will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
However, if a probationer's violation of a probation condition was not willful, or
was beyond the probationer's control, a court may not revoke probation and order
imprisonment without first considering alternative methods to address the
violation.

156 Idaho at 222-23 (emphasis added) (quoting Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 105); see also State v.

Lafferty, 125 Idaho 278, 380, 382 (Ct. App. 1994) (holding the defendant's probation violation

3

I.C.R. 33(f) was previously codified at I.C.R. 33(e). See Order, In re: Amendment of Idaho
Criminal
Rule
(I.C.R.)
33,
dated
April
23,
2015,
available
at
http://www.isc. idaho .gov/orders/I CR_Order_33_ 7 .15. pdf, at p. 3.
6

was non-willful because defendant's disability prevented him from performing a work
assignment). The burden is on the State to show a willful violation. Id. at 382.
In this case, the State accused Ms. Henning of violating the term of her probation to pay
restitution. (R., p.128.) Ms. Henning was required to "pay at least $8,000 per year for restitution
or $665 per month beginning within 30 days after employment." (R., p.135.) She was accused
of violating this term by not paying the full monthly amount from May 2018 through January
2019. (R., pp.127-29.) She was required to make monthly payments of $650. 4 At the time of
the evidentiary hearing, Ms. Henning had paid $2,663 over the six months, instead of the $3,900
she owed for that period. (State's Exhibit 1.)
At that time, Ms. Henning was employed in the service industry, making $5 per hour plus
tips. (10/01/19 Tr., p.14, L.23 -p.15, L.21.) Ms. Henning was asked by one probation officer to
prepare a written budget (Defendant's Exhibit A), which documented her monthly income and
expenses. (10/1/19 Tr., p.6, L.19 - p.9, L.5.) Ms. Henning's income varied because she relied
heavily on tips.

(Defendant's Exhibit A.)

Ms. Henning also submitted a payment ability

evaluation, dated February 1, 2019. (10/1/19 Tr., p.8, Ls.18-21; State's Exhibit 2.) The Payment
Ability Evaluation indicated that she made $2,441.14 per month, but had $641 in monthly bills
for medical care and insurance. (R., pp.144-52.) Ms. Henning also testified that she was paying
$400 per month for rent, plus $200 for utilities.

(10/1/19 Tr., p.18, L.8 - p.19, L.11.)

Ms. Henning estimated $400 per month for groceries, she owned a 2010 vehicle costing $286 per
month for payments and insurance, and she had a cellular telephone, because her home did not
4

Ms. Henning was required to pay $8,000 per year. (R., p.100.) The monthly breakdown is a
little more than $665 per month; however, the district court at one hearing told Ms. Henning she
was required to make payments of$650 per month. (10/1/19 Tr., p.46, Ls.4-11.) Regardless of
the precise monthly amount owed, Ms. Henning was unable to make the full payment each
month from June 2018 to January 2019, the months she is accused of violating her probation.
(10/1/19 Tr., p.43, Ls.6-9.)
7

have a landline. (10/1/19 Tr., p.19, L.12 - p.20, L.13.) Ms. Henning also had additional vehicle
maintenance expenses that were not on her budget.

(10/1/19 Tr., p.21, Ls.1-16.)

Further,

Ms. Henning's probation officer testified that Ms. Henning had come to him in December of
2018, and said she was struggling financially to make the requisite monthly payment.
(10/1/2019 Tr., p.11, Ls.2-28.) Prior to December 2018, Ms. Henning did not have medical
insurance and was paying out-of-pocket for medication and medical treatment.

(10/1/19

Tr., p.22, Ls.5-11.) Ms. Henning's medical expenses had gone up, culminating in surgery later
that spring. For example, in January 2019, Ms. Henning documented $750 in medical expenses.
(Defendant's Exhibit A.)
Around this time, Ms. Henning had serious medical problems. 5 In 2005, Ms. Henning
had a ventral shunt placed to drain her spinal fluid into her abdominal cavity; however, she
continued to suffer from post-surgical complications. (10/1/19 Tr., p.22, L.16 - p.23, L.11.) In
January 2019, Ms. Henning went to see a neurosurgeon due to abdominal pain, and she learned
that the tube had perforated her bowel. (10/1/19 Tr., p.23, Ls.2-21.) She subsequently had
surgery to remove the shunt and the adhesions on her intestine in March 2019.

(10/1/19

Tr., p.24, Ls.2-6.) As a result, Ms. Henning incurred additional medical expenses and was
unable to work for a week.

(10/1/19 Tr., p.24, Ls.7-24.)

She suffered post-surgery

complications and was in and out of the emergency room, ending in a hospital stay of one or two
days. (10/1/19 Tr., p.24, L.10 - p.25, L.2.) Ms. Henning advised her probation officer that she
was unable to work for a week and one-half to two weeks. (10/1/19 Tr., p.25, Ls.1-11.) At the

5

Although the most costly of Ms. Henning's medical expenses were incurred after the pertinent
dates she was accused of violating her probation, her increased medical expenses are germane to
the issues on appeal, because the district court considered Ms. Henning' s restitution payments
made between the evidentiary hearing and the sentencing/disposition hearing in deciding to
revoke probation. (11/26/19 Tr., p.53, L.10-p.54, L.14.)
8

time of the probation violation disposition hearing, Ms. Henning estimated that she still owed
close to $1,000 on her medical bills. (10/1/19 Tr., p.26, Ls.1-8.)
Although Ms. Henning' s budget was not precise, it demonstrated that she was making
restitution payments in the amounts she could afford.

Ms. Henning made payments to her

restitution balance every month during the time at issue-from June 2018 to January 2019.
(10/1/19 Tr., p.42, Ls.7-9; State's Exhibit 1.)

Ms. Henning demonstrated that she was not

willfully withholding money from restitution payments, but she was paying what should could
every month-she was simply unable to pay the full amount each month. (10/1/19 Tr., p.44,
Ls.10-25.)
The State claimed that the car payments were a choice-that Ms. Henning should have
bought a car for a couple hundred dollars or "maybe a little more expensive if you want
something more reliable." (10/1/19 Tr., p.39, Ls.3-13.) The State took issue with Ms. Henning's
rent at $499 per month, and claimed that there were less expensive options, but did not providing
any evidence of support of its claim. (10/1/19 Tr., p.39, Ls.19-22.)
In faulting Ms. Henning for failing to establish that there was not a cheaper alternative to
her rent or car payments, the State shifted its burden to prove that Ms. Henning willfully violated
her probation to Ms. Henning, arguing that she had not proven that she was living as cheaply as
possible.

The burden is on the State, however, to prove the allegations by substantial and

competent evidence. Lafferty, 125 Idaho at 382. The burden is not on Ms. Henning to prove that
there were not cheaper car or rental options or to show that she would not be eligible to stay at
the homeless shelter. 6

6

The district court suggested at the probation violation disposition hearing that Ms. Henning
should live at the homeless shelter. (11/26/19 Tr., p.64, Ls.20-23.)
9

At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court found the State proved the probation
violation allegation and expressly found that the violation was willful:
The question - I think nobody's disputing that [Ms. Henning did not pay $650 per
month during the relevant time period]. The question is whether or not her failure
to pay was willful. And it seems to me that I have to think about what are the
expenses that are available to - what income is available to her against which
expenses are necessary.
It doesn't appear to me that she could have made the entire - well, there may have
been a couple months that she could have made the entire payment and she didn't
based upon surpluses reflected in her exhibits.
But even those months where she couldn't have made those payments, there
appears to me to be, at least technically, violations based upon what she did have
and what she could have paid and her decision not to pay what she could even if it
was short of the $650 or $665.
I'm not satisfied that the surpluses were spent in a way that was consistent with
complying with the terms of her probation.
Based on the consideration of all of the evidence and her ability and what weight I
can attach to the testimony, I'm going to find that the State has met its burden that
Ms. Henning has willfully violated her probation by failing to pay at least as
much as she could.
(10/1/19 Tr., p.46, L.12-p.47, L.24.) Substantial and competent evidence does not support such
a finding. The evidence shows Ms. Henning made bona fide efforts to pay restitution every
month. (State's Exhibit 1.) Ms. Henning was working as a waitress at this time and living with a
roommate. (10/01/19 Tr., p.14, L.23 -p.15, L.21.) ) She was not living an extravagant lifestyle
on her $1,852 to $2,929 per month earnings. (Defendant's Exhibit A.) Although the State and
the district court faulted Ms. Henning for having a cell phone, a cell phone is a necessity, not a
luxury, for most people. See Johnson v. State, 126 So.3d 1129, 1131 n.4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2012) (noting trial court's dismissal of State's argument that cell phone was a "luxury item," and
instead concluding that a cell phone was a necessity).; see also Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373,
395 (2014) (discussing the rarity of an American adult who does not have a cellular phone where

more than 90% of American adults own one); City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 760
(2010) (discussing cell phone and text message communications and concluding they "are so
pervasive that some persons may consider them to be essential means or necessary instruments
for self-expression, even self-identification.")
The State has not met its burden to show willful violations based on the evidence
presented at the evidentiary hearing. Because Ms. Henning's probation violation was not willful,
the court erred by revoking her probation. See Clausen, 163 Idaho at 184.

II.
Alternatively, The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Revoking Ms. Henning's Probation

A.

Introduction
Assuming arguendo the evidence is sufficient to support the district court's finding that

Ms. Henning willfully violated her probation, Ms. Henning asserts that the district court abused
its discretion by revoking her probation and imposing her sentence.

B.

Standard Of Review
"After a probation violation has been proven, the decision to revoke probation and

pronounce sentence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court." State v. Roy, 113 Idaho
388, 392 (Ct. App. 1987). In reviewing a trial court's decision for an abuse of discretion, the
relevant inquiry regards four factors:
Whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached
its decision by the exercise of reason.

Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).
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"A judge cannot revoke probation arbitrarily," however. State v. Lee, 116 Idaho 38, 40
(Ct. App. 1989).

"The purpose of probation is to give the defendant an opportunity to be

rehabilitated under proper control and supervision."

State v. Mummert, 98 Idaho 452, 454

(1977). "In determining whether to revoke probation a court must consider whether probation is
meeting the objective of rehabilitation while also providing adequate protection for society."

State v. Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275 (Ct. App. 1995).
The district court is empowered by statute to revoke a defendant's probation under
certain circumstances. LC. §§ 19-2602, -2603, 20-222. The Court uses a two-step analysis to
review a probation revocation proceeding.

Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 106.

First, the Court

determines "whether the defendant violated the terms of his probation." Id. Second, "[i]f it is
determined that the defendant has in fact violated the terms of his probation," the Court examines
"what should be the consequences of that violation." Id.

The determination of a probation

violation and the determination of the consequences, if any, are separate analyses. Id.
Only if the trial court determines that alternatives to imprisonment are not adequate in a
particular situation to meet the state's legitimate interest in punishment, deterrence, or the
protection of society, may the court imprison a probationer who has made sufficient, genuine
efforts to obey the terms of the probation order. Lafferty, 125 Idaho at 382.

1.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Essentially Re-Sentenced
Ms. Henning At The Probation Violation Disposition Hearing

The district court abused its discretion by failing to act consistently with the legal
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it, and by failing to exercise reason,
when it told Ms. Henning that it was not sentencing her for her probation violation, but was
sentencing her as it would have sentenced her originally, had it been the district court assigned to

12

Ms. Henning' s case from the beginning.

Instead of considering the appropriate factors for

evaluating a probation violation decision-whether probation is meeting the objective of
rehabilitation while also providing adequate protection for society-the district court essentially
re-sentenced Ms. Henning to the sentence the court said it would have imposed, given the facts
ofher initial crime.
The sentencing court had already determined that Ms. Henning was an appropriate
candidate for probation. Nothing precludes the sentencing judge, after considering "the wide
range of factors underlying the exercise of his sentencing function" from imposing "the
maximum penalty prescribed by law." Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 670 (1983). "The
decision to place the defendant on probation, however, reflects a determination by the sentencing
court that the State's penological interests do not require imprisonment." Id. The district court
for the disposition hearing was required to determine whether Ms. Henning's probation violation
warranted revocation, to determine "whether probation is meeting the objective of rehabilitation
while also providing adequate protection for society."

Upton, 127 Idaho at 275.

The

considerations for the sentencing court and disposition court are different, and the disposition
court cannot take on the role of resentencing the defendant for the initial offense.
Instead, during Ms. Henning's probation violation disposition hearing, the prosecutor
discussed the underlying crime, arguing to the court, "I am asking the Court to impose the
sentence that was previously given to Ms. Henning, but I'm not doing it because she isn't paying
her restitution per se. I'm asking that the Court do that because she embezzled almost $200,000
from [the victim] and that crime deserves prison." (11/26/19 Tr., p.55, Ls.19-24.) The district
court agreed, telling Ms. Henning, "You were fortunate that Judge Neville was here the first
time, because, frankly, I would have sent you to prison the first time." (11/26/19 Tr., p.63,

13

Ls.23-25.) The district court told Ms. Henning at disposition, "[the prosecutor]'s right, this isn't
about the probation violation. This is a sentence for the original offense." (11/26/19 Tr. p.65,
Ls.2-4.)
Instead of considering whether the probation violation warranted revocation, the district
court put itself in the place of the sentencing court and concluded that Ms. Henning should have
been sentenced to prison from the start. This was an abuse of discretion.

2.

The District Court Erred By Revoking Ms. Henning's Probation Without First
Considering Alternatives To Address The Violation

Even though the district court's decision to revoke probation is a matter within the court's
discretion, Roy, 113 Idaho at 392, the court's decision must be consistent with "constitutional
standards." 7 State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 606, 607 (Ct. App. 2007). The Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees "equal protection of the laws," and the Due Process
Clause prohibits the State from depriving any person of "life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Consistent with these constitutional standards, a
deprivation of liberty based solely on the individual's indigent status may run contrary to the
"fundamental fairness required by the Fourteenth Amendment." Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672-73;
7

In United States v. Wilson, the Second Circuit reasoned:
However, this discretion is not unlimited and revocation of probation solely
because of impecunity would not only be of doubtful constitutionality, see
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970); Tate v.
Short, 401 U.S. 395, 91 S.Ct. 668, 28 L.Ed.2d 130 (1971), but would probably be
an abuse of discretion, since the result would be to punish for poverty. See, e. g.,
United States v. Taylor, 321 F.2d 339 (4th Cir. 1963) (revocation of probation
based on good faith inability to pay deemed an abuse of discretion); but cf
Genet v. United States, 375 F.2d 960 (10th Cir. 1967) (revocation not an abuse of
discretion where reason for making support payments a condition of probation
was not rehabilitation but assurance of continuing support for dependents).

469 F.2d 368, 370 (2nd Cir. 1972).
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see also Braaten, 144 Idaho at 608. That is so because "there can be no equal justice where the

kind of trial"-or sentence-"a man gets depends on the amount of money he has." Bearden,
461 U.S. at 664 (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (plurality opinion)).
To determine whether a criminal defendant's indigence may permissibly affect the
sentence, the Court applies a balancing test with elements of both the due process and equal
protection analyses.

See Braaten, 144 Idaho at 608.

Separately, these two analyses are as

follows:
To determine whether this differential treatment [based on indigency] violates the
Equal Protection Clause, one must determine whether, and under what
circumstances, a defendant's indigent status may be considered in the decision
whether to revoke probation. This is substantially similar to asking directly the
due process question of whether and when it is fundamentally unfair or arbitrary
for the State to revoke probation when an indigent is unable to pay the fine.
Braaten, 144 Idaho 308-09 (quoting Bearden, 461 U.S. at 665-66). In Bearden, for example, the

U.S. Supreme Court examined whether the defendant's equal protection and due process rights
were violated by the revocation of his probation due to his failure to pay the imposed fine and
restitution. 461 U.S. at 665-73. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the revocation of probation
was "permissible" only if the defendant "did not make sufficient bona fide efforts to pay his
fine" or "alternate punishment is not adequate to meet the State's interests in punishment and
deterrence." Id. at 674; see also id. at 672-73. Whether this issue is "analyzed in terms of equal
protection or due process," the factors to be considered are: "the nature of the individual interest
affected, the extent to which it is affected, the rationality of the connection between legislative
means and purpose, [and] the existence of alternative means for effectuating the purpose .... "
Braaten, 144 Idaho at 609 (quoting Bearden, 461 U.S. at 666 (alterations in original)).

Imprisoning a defendant "solely because he lacks funds to pay the fine," without considering the
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reasons for the inability to pay or examining alternatives, 1s constitutionally impermissible.

Bearden, 461 U.S. at 674.

a.

Ms. Henning Made Bona Fide Efforts To Pay Restitution

Ms. Henning did not make all of these payments in full, leaving her approximately
$1,200 short over the six-month time period.

(State's Exhibit 1.)

Ms. Henning continued

making monthly payments, even after the State filed a probation violation. (11/26/19 Tr., p.53,
L.15 - p.54, L.8.) After the October 17, 2019 probation violation hearing, Ms. Henning made
two more payments-one on October 28 for $450, and one in November for $400. (11/26/19
Tr., p.54, Ls.2-14.) At Ms. Henning's disposition hearing, the prosecutor asked for imposition of
the prison sentence, not because Ms. Henning failed to make restitution payments in full, but
because of his outrage regarding the facts surrounding the initial crime. (11/26/19 Tr., p.55,
Ls.2-24.) Defense counsel asked the court to continue Ms. Henning on probation so she could
keep making payments to the victim, but to require her to take budget classes and submit a
detailed budget, including receipts, to her probation officer monthly. (11/26/19 Tr., p.62, Ls.612.) Defense counsel reminded the court that Ms. Henning had not committed new offenses, she
simply came up short on her restitution payments. (11/26/19 Tr., p.62, L.22 - p.63, L. 1.)
The district court revoked Ms. Henning's probation. (11/26/19 Tr., p.65, Ls.5-12.) The
court concluded,
[Y]our first obligation is to pay back the restitution. It's not to provide yourself
with a car. It's not to provide yourself with a cell phone. It's not to pay rent.
When - well, at $400 a month, without establishing that there isn't any cheaper
alternative out there, if you hadn't bought a car, if you hadn't bought a cell phone,
if you showed me that you rented a room in a house for 200 bucks a month or you
stayed at the shelter or whatever, you clearly can make almost 1,900 bucks a
month, you - this is not impossible for you to pay back.
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The reason it didn't get paid back is because you chose your own comfort and
convenience over making your victims whole.
(11/26/19 Tr., p.64, L.12 -p.65, L.1.)
Ms. Henning contends that the district court revoked her probation due to her indigent
status. The district court revoked probation because Ms. Henning failed to pay the full amount
owed as restitution each month, but the only reason Ms. Henning failed to pay the full amount
was due to her inability to pay. Imprisoning Ms. Henning for her poverty is constitutionally
impermissible, and the district court abused its discretion by imprisoning Ms. Henning.

b.

Alternative Punishment Would Have Been Adequate To Meet The State's
Interests

"The next factor to be weighed is the State's interest or purpose and the rationality of the
connection between this purpose and the means used to accomplish it." Braaten. 144 Idaho at
610.

This factor also considers "the existence of alternate means" to effectuate the State's

purpose. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 666; see also Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 105 (discussing the required
analysis of alternate means for non-willful violations generally). The U.S. Supreme Court has
provided considerable guidance on this factor in the context of a revocation of probation. The
U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged, "The State, of course, has a fundamental interest in
appropriately punishing persons-rich and poor-who violate its criminal laws. A defendant's
poverty in no way immunizes him from punishment." Bearden, 461 U.S. at 669. "The decision
to place the defendant on probation, however, reflects a determination by the sentencing court
that the State's penological interests do not require imprisonment." Id. at 670. Thus, the State's
interests in punishment and deterrence are diminished when the defendant is already determined
to be an appropriate candidate for probation. Moreover, a probationer, such as Ms. Henning,
who has made "sufficient bona fide efforts" to pay restitution, and who has "complied with the
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other conditions of probation," 8 "has demonstrated a willingness to pay his debt to society and an
ability to conform his conduct to social norms." Id. This further diminishes the requirement of
imprisonment "to satisfy the State's interests." Id.
Although the Braaten Court held that the district court did not violate defendant's right to
equal protection or due process when it considered his indigence in deciding whether probation
would be a viable option, that case is distinguishable from Ms. Henning's case:
Balancing all of the factors identified in Bearden, we hold that the district court
did not violate Braaten's right to equal protection or due process when it
considered his indigence in deciding whether probation would be a tenable option.
Braaten was denied probation not because of his lack of resources per se, but
because of the effect of that lack of resources on the likelihood that he could be
adequately supervised and the community protected if he were placed on
probation. There has been no showing of any reasonable alternatives that would
have adequately served the State's purpose to protect society.
144 Idaho at 610.

As stated in Bearden, "Only if the sentencing court determines that

alternatives to imprisonment are not adequate in a particular situation to meet the State's interest
in punishment and deterrence may the State imprison a probationer who has made sufficient
bona fide efforts to pay." 461 U.S. at 672; see also id. ("[T]he court must consider alternate
measures of punishment other than imprisonment."); Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 106. Ms. Henning
submits that the district court abused its discretion by punishing her for her indigency, without
considering her bona fide efforts to pay and, most importantly, the alternate means to effectuate
the State's interests.
Here, continuing Ms. Henning on probation does not present an undue risk to society.

See Braaten, 144 Idaho at 610.

Ms. Henning demonstrated that she was not willfully

withholding money from restitution payments, but she was paying what she could every

8

Other than the fmancial issues, Ms. Henning complied with the terms of her probation.
(11/26/19 Tr., p.62, Ls.22-25.)
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month-she was simply unable to pay the full amount each month. (10/1/19 Tr., p.44, Ls.1025.) Further, Ms. Henning presented an alternate means to effectuate the State's interests of
rehabilitation and protection of society. Ms. Henning, through counsel, suggested that the court
continue her on probation so she could keep making payments to the victim, but to require her to
take budget classes and submit a detailed budget, including receipts, to her probation officer
monthly. (11/26/19 Tr., p.62, Ls.6-12.) Ms. Henning had not committed new offenses, she
simply came up short on her restitution payments.

(11/26/19 Tr., p.62, L.22 - p.63, L.1.)

Ms. Henning recognized her need to pay restitution and tried to pay to the best of her abilities.
The district court failed to weigh these factors as required by Bearden and Braaten.

3.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion Where Revocation Does Not Serve The
Objective Of Rehabilitation

"The purpose of probation is to give the defendant an opportunity to be rehabilitated
under proper control and supervision." State v. Mummert, 98 Idaho 452, 454 (1977). "[T]he
primary purpose of restitution in Idaho is remediation," thus it is not intended to be punitive.
State v. Cottrell, 152 Idaho 387, 397 (Ct. App. 2012).

Ms. Henning submits that the district court abused its discretion by revoking her
probation because the violation did not justify revocation. As explained Ms. Henning's counsel,
there was no allegation that Ms. Henning failed to comply with probation for any reason other
than her inability to pay in full the restitution owed each month. (11/26/19 Tr., p.62, L.22 -p.63,
L.1.) Ms. Henning wanted to pay restitution, and she fully appreciated the need for restitution.
But, like many individuals, Ms. Henning struggled to follow a budget and stay up-to-date on all
her expenses. (11/26/19 Tr., p.59, L.16 - p.60, L.13; Defendant's Exhibit A; State's Exhibit 1.)
In order to succeed on probation, Ms. Henning simply needed instruction and guidance to learn
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how to manage her finances, which she requested at the probation violation disposition hearing.
(11/26/19 Tr., p.62, Ls.6-12.) Instead of punishing Ms. Henning for her inability to pay with a
three to twenty-four-year prison sentence (thereby removing her ability to pay for several years,
during which time the amount owed is collecting interest), Ms. Henning should have been given
an opportunity to develop these money-management skills while on probation. This alternative to
imprisonment would have furthered Ms. Henning's rehabilitation while advancing the State's
interest in fully compensating the victim. Ms. Henning submits that the district court abused its
discretion by revoking her probation.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Henning respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order
revoking probation and reinstate her probation.

Alternatively, she requests that this Court

remand the case to a different district court for a new pro bat ion violation evidentiary hearing
and/or disposition hearing.
DATED this 3rd day ofJune, 2020.

/s/ Sally J. Cooley
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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